



Feminist research has increasingly highlighted the need to look beyond a focus 
predominantly on sexual violence and to explore other gendered experiences of armed 
conflict and political repression (see, for example, Franke, 2006; Harris Rimmer, 
2010; Ní Aoláin, Haynes and Cahn, 2011; Lemaitre & Sandvik, 2014, Sankey, 2015).  
Indeed, recent research has begun to address the gendered nature of socio-economic 
violence and of forced displacement (Meertens and Zambrano, 2010; Lemaitre & 
Sandvik, 2014).  Further research is now needed to theorise broader gendered harms 
and analyse how such harms are treated in international criminal tribunals.  The 
article focuses on case 002/01 before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC), a case that has so far not been addressed by feminist scholars, as 
it did not include crimes of sexual violence.  However, while the case does not at first 
sight involve issues of gender, a more detailed exploration begins to open up the 
subtle nature of gendered experiences.  
 
 The ECCC is a hybrid tribunal, involving a mix of international and 
Cambodian law and international and national personnel.  It was established in 2004 
by a bilateral agreement between the United Nations and the Cambodian Government 
in order to prosecute “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were 
most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, 
international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized 
by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 
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1979”.1  The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court include genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, as well as certain crimes under Cambodian law 
perpetrated during the Khmer Rouge regime. The Court is noteworthy for its 
innovative system of civil party participation, which allows admitted victims to 
participate as civil parties in a case, and for its more inquisitorial approach.  
Following the conviction of Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch) for crimes related to the 
infamous s-21 prison, in case 001, the Court is now proceeding with its second case, 
which is far more complicated and involves a wide range of offences perpetrated 
throughout Cambodia during the regime.2  Case 002/01 involved a small part of this 
second case, centred on two of the phases of the forced population movements, 
including the mass removal of the population from the capital, Phnom Penh.3 
 
 Drawing on feminist theories of the social nature of harm and on insights from 
civil party oral testimony, the article critiques the narrative produced by the judgment 
in case 002/01 (for discussion of social harm see West, 1997; Conaghan, 2002; Ní 
                                                 
1 Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 
6 June 2003. 
2 Co-Prosecutors v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Trial Chamber, Judgement, Case File No. 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC, 26 July 2010; Co-Prosecutors v Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, and Khieu 
Samphan, Closing Order, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCI, 15 September, 2010.  
3  It also included crimes perpetrated in relation to and the Tuol Po Chrey execution site.  Co-
Prosecutors v Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, Decision On Severance Of Case 002 Following 
Supreme Court Chamber Decision Of 8 February 2013, Case File No 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 
April 2013.  
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Aoláin, 2009).4  While the centrality of the forced population movements to the case 
provided the ECCC with considerable scope for recognising lived experiences of 
forced displacement and gendered harms, such an opportunity was not fully realised. 
The article focuses on harms of familial separation and the starvation of family 
members stemming from forced displacement; harms that have received limited 
scholarly attention, but may be central to gendered experiences (Ní Aoláin, 2009, 
234). It argues for the importance of foregrounding a social understanding of harm 
that reflects human relationships and connectedness in order to open up gendered 
experiences. 
 
 The article is based on a reading of the testimony of twenty-five of the civil 
parties in the case who directly discussed their experiences of phase one and/or phase 
two of the population movements.5  The testimony was researched through the ECCC 
website, which provides day-to-day transcripts as well as videos of the testimony.  
The research also draws on semi-structured interviews with English-speaking lawyers 
and court personnel conducted during a visit to the Court in June 2014.6  Clearly, 
there are limitations to this research given its use of a small range of oral testimony, 
as well as possible problems of translation, which the article acknowledges.  
However, the aim is not to provide an overview of the harms of forced displacement 
                                                 
4 Co-Prosecutors v Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, Trial Chamber, Judgement, Case File No 002/19-
09-2007/ECCC/TC, 7 August 2014. 
5 While there were 31 civil parties who gave oral testimony before the Court, the research only draws 
on 25 of the civil parties, whose testimony directly related to experiences of the two phases of the 
population movements.   
6 The research visit was funded by a SLS Research Activities Grant.  The interviews were conducted in 
private at the Court and interviewees are referred to anonymously in the paper.   
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experienced in Cambodia, but rather to begin to listen to the experiences of these civil 
parties and to examine the judgment in light of such experiences.  A reading of the 
civil party oral testimony provides a counterpoint to the narrative of the judgment and 
generates insights into gendered experiences beyond sexual violence.    
 
 The first part of the article contextualises the treatment of gendered 
experiences of harm in case 002/01 by outlining the limited gender awareness at the 
ECCC and the potential significance of civil party participation.  The second part 
highlights the centrality of social understandings of harm to capturing gendered 
experiences and opens up the harms of familial separation and starvation of family 
members. The final part focuses on the treatment of the forced population movements 
in the Trial Chamber judgment. Drawing on the civil party testimony, it critiques the 
lack of contextualisation of the harms in the judgment in relation to Cambodian 
society and the silencing of diverse gendered experiences.  In what follows, the article 
aims to contribute to feminist research by placing theories of social harm in relation to 
lived experiences in Cambodia, and to provide a basis for further scrutiny of the 
narratives produced by the ECCC in the remaining parts of case 002 and subsequent 
cases.   
 
Contextualising the treatment of gender at the ECCC and the background to 
case 002/01 
 
Despite increased recognition of the need for gender-sensitivity in international 
criminal law, the ECCC initially failed to investigate crimes of sexual violence 
(Studzinsky, 2013).  Unlike the International Criminal Court (ICC), the ECCC does 
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not have a gender advisor and there have been criticisms of a lack of gender balance 
in its investigative personnel (Killean, 2015). While the Law on the ECCC includes 
rape as a crime against humanity, it does not mirror the more extensive approach of 
the Rome Statute of the ICC, and thus does not explicitly include sexual slavery, 
forced pregnancy and other comparable forms of sexual harm. 7  Sexual violence other 
than rape therefore will need to be incorporated under the other crimes against 
humanity, namely ‘other inhumane acts’. The limited focus on gender issues at the 
Court has inevitably shaped its treatment of harms of forced displacement in case 
002/01. Despite some shifts towards acknowledgment of sexual violence at the Court, 
this has yet to be comprehensive and it seems likely that broader gendered 
experiences will continue to be obscured unless there are shifts in the ECCC’s 
approach (see Killean, 2015).  It is therefore important to outline this broader context 
of a lack of gender awareness and the possible impact of civil party participation, 
before reflecting on the background to case 002/01.   
 
Civil Party Participation and Gender-Awareness at the ECCC 
 
Although victim-oriented approaches form an increasing trend in international 
criminal justice, as evident in the approach of the ICC, the hybrid nature of ECCC 
allowed it to develop a distinctive and (initially) more comprehensive approach to the 
role of victims/survivors (McGonigle Leyh, 2012; Hoven, 2014; Elander, 2013). 
While the ECCC statute did not include provisions on victim participation, the civil 
                                                 
7  Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as 
promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006); Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998. 
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law basis of the Court allowed the judges to develop and tailor the domestic law 
practice to the particular context of the ECCC.  Victims at the ECCC can become 
civil parties in a case, provided that they can link the harms suffered to the crimes 
charged.8  Civil party status provides the right to participate as a formal party in the 
proceedings, with rights that are, in theory, similar to those of the prosecution and the 
defence.  This therefore goes beyond the rights provided by the victim participation 
procedure at the ICC (Stegmiller, 2014). Admitted civil parties have the status of legal 
parties to the proceedings and can seek collective and moral reparations.9  In addition, 
victims can submit complaints to the Co-Prosecutors, which are taken into account 
when deciding whether or not to prosecute.  
 
 Significantly, women have constituted a majority of the civil party 
participants. The gender ratio of admitted civil parties to case 002 (those accepted by 
the Court as having met the criteria for admissibility) is 2,371 female out of a total of 
3,867 participants; meaning that 61.31% are women.10   There are many complex 
factors influencing the high numbers of female civil party participants before the 
Court (interview with a civil party lawyer, 30th June 2014).  One significant factor 
may be the higher number of women surviving the Khmer Rouge regime, since men 
were targeted more frequently for direct killing (Boua, 1982).  Whatever the reasons, 
the high female participation rate raises the potential for women’s experiences to be 
voiced at the ECCC. Indeed, in case 002/01, seventeen out of the twenty-five civil 
                                                 
8 Rule 23 bis (I) of the ECCC Internal Rules. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Statistics received from the Victims Support Section of the ECCC. 
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parties who gave oral testimony on phase one and two of the population movements 
were female.   
 
 Civil party participation has played a role in beginning to challenge the lack of 
gender awareness at the ECCC, particularly regarding the Court’s treatment of sexual 
violence (interview with civil party lawyer, 30th June 2014; SáCouto, 2011). The 
preliminary investigations at the Court did not include sexual violence or other 
gender-based harms.  This was in part due to the Court’s acceptance of Khmer Rouge 
claims that sexual and gender-based violence had not been prevalent; claims that have 
been increasing challenged by survivors and civil society organisations and shown to 
be false (Natale, 2011; Kasumi, 2006; Ye, 2014; Studzinsky, 2013). While in case 
001, Kaing Guek Eav was convicted of one incident involving rape, attempts by civil 
party lawyers to include further counts of sexual violence failed (Studzinsky, 2013).11  
As Studzinsky critiques, “although the ECCC was established after the ad hoc 
tribunals and the ICC, the ECCC seems to be far behind these courts with regard to 
the investigation of sexual crimes”.   
 
 Civil party participation has allowed for the contestation of the initial 
exclusion of rape in the context of forced marriage, leading to forced marriage being 
charged in case 002.  Nevertheless, the charges do not extend to rape outside of forced 
marriage, meaning that many other forms of sexual violence will continue to be 
                                                 
11 Co-Prosecutors v. Kaing Guek Eav, n 2.   
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silenced (de Langis, 2014; Wallström, 2012).12  It may be that civil party participation 
will promote greater gender awareness in cases 003 and 004, provided these cases 
come to trial.  Indeed, the International Co-Prosecutor has more recently filed 
submissions requesting investigations of sexual violence both inside and outside of 
forced marriage in case 004 and inside of forced marriage in case 003.13   
 
 While civil party participation therefore provides possibilities for survivors to 
have a greater input into proceedings, this potential is dependent on the Court hearing 
women’s and men’s diverse voices and reflecting these experiences in a sensitive and 
meaningful way (SáCouto, 2011).  Indeed, the space for gendered experiences to be 
voiced receded in case 002 due to adaptions to the procedures on civil party 
participation. The large number of civil parties in case 002 has undoubtedly posed 
logistical issues for the Court, particularly concerning representation (see Sperfeld, 
2013). These concerns led judges to revise the procedures in order to simplify and 
restrict participation (Stegmiller, 2014; Hoven, 2014).  Civil parties were no longer 
able to participate individually in proceedings but had to do so as a “consolidated 
group”, with two Lead Co-Lawyers given responsibility for coordinating the approach 
                                                 
12  Co-Prosecutors v Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, Trial Chamber, Decision on Additional 
Severance of Case 002 and Scope of Case 002/02, Case File Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCCITC, 4 
April 2014, E301/9/1. 
13 ECCC, Press Release, ‘International Co-Prosecutor Requests Investigation of Alleged Sexual and 
Gender-Based Violence in Case 004’ (24 April 2014), at www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/internationalco- 
prosecutor-requests-investigation-alleged-sexual-and-gender-based-violence; Press Release, 




of the civil parties and representing Civil Parties before the Trial Chamber and 
Supreme Court Chamber (Hoven, 2014). As such, there has been a move away from 
the original vision of civil party participation towards a more circumscribed model, 
where victims are no longer truly ‘parties’ in the case (Hoven, 2014).   In addition, 
there have been significant resourcing issues, resulting in reliance on pro bono civil 
party lawyers, which may affect the quality of representation and the time lawyers are 
able to spend with civil parties. 
 
 As with other criminal tribunals, and despite its more inquisitorial approach 
and structures, the ECCC necessarily restricts and shapes testimony to meet the needs 
of the criminal justice process (see more generally Haslam & Dembour, 2004). 
Significantly, the Trial Chamber did allow four trial days of victim impact hearings, 
during which fifteen of the civil parties could testify more broadly to their suffering 
experienced.14 Although still subject to time constraints, these sessions provided an 
important space for survivor testimony and opened up some of the physical, 
psychological and social harms experienced. The research in the article is based on 
exploration both of the civil party oral testimony during segment three of the trial 
(focused on the forced population movements) and the civil party oral testimonies 
during the victim impact hearings.  While the article cannot do justice to the enormity 
of the harms discussed, it seeks to listen to the voices of these civil parties, in order to 
open up some of their experiences and to scrutinise the narrative produced by the 
Trial Chamber judgment.   
 
Outlining the background to case 002/01 
                                                 
14 These four days of testimony were held between 27th May 2013 and 4th June 2013. 
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Case 002 initially involved four defendants, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, Ieng 
Sary and Ieng Thirith, who were indicted on 15 September 2010 on charges related to 
crimes against humanity, genocide and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949.15  Following the death of Ieng Sary in March 2014 and Ieng Thirith being found 
unfit to stand trial in November 2011, there were concerns about the possible length 
of the case.16  Due to the frailty of the two remaining defendants and to expedite the 
trial to ensure a timely judgment, the Trial Chamber took the decision to sever case 
002 into different parts (see Williams, 2015). 17  The first part, designated as case 
002/01, was given a narrow focus on phase one and two of the population movements 
(the displacement from the capital Phnom Penh and other cities in April 1975 and the 
regional displacements perpetrated from September 1975 to 1977) as well as the 
crimes related to the Tuol Po Chrey execution site.18  The second part, case 002/02, is 
currently at the trial stage and involves further charges under the Closing Order in 
case 002.19  
 
 The severance of case 002 has resulted in a paucity of academic focus on case 
002/01 and it seems that commentators are waiting for the outcome of the rest of case 
002 (Williams, 2014).  However, academic engagement with case 002/01 is 
important, particularly as issues raised in the case may well be dealt with similarly in 
                                                 
15 Co-Prosecutors v Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, n 4 above.  
16  Co-Prosecutors v Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan, Decision on Ieng 
Thirith’s Fitness to Stand Trial, Case File No 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, 17 November 2011. 
17 Co-Prosecutors v Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, n 4.  
18 ibid. 
19 Co-Prosecutors v Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan, n. 2 above. 
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the remaining cases.  The severance of the case raises issues concerning how the 
charges in case 002/01 and case 002/02 are addressed, whether the interrelationships 
between the harms involved in these cases will be reflected and the nature of the 
overall narrative produced by the judgments. 
 While case 002/01 is narrow in scope, it involved grave crimes related to the 
forced population movements and de-urbanisation of Cambodia.  The evacuation of 
Phnom Penh and other urban areas, which constituted phase one of the population 
movements, began the same day (17th April 1975) as the fall of the city into Khmer 
Rouge control. The whole population of the capital city (between two to three million 
people) were forced to evacuate, regardless of sickness, infirmity or other 
vulnerabilities and the vast majority were not able to return to Phnom Penh until the 
regime’s collapse in 1979 (Kiernan, 2002). Phase two encompassed the forced 
displacement of the ‘new people’ (those previously displaced from urban areas) from 
the various regions to other worksites within Cambodia, between September 1975 and 
1977.20 
 
 The evidence has suggested a high death toll due to the harsh conditions, with 
perhaps as many as 10,600 deaths during the evacuation of Phnom Penh (Kiernan, 
2002, 48; see also Trial Chamber judgment, para. 521).  During phase one of the 
population movements and their immediate aftermath, individuals were often unable 
to feed their children, as basic resources were not provided.  Families were often 
separated as they were forced to leave immediately and were not allowed to search for 
family members, and many families have never been reunited.  During phase two of 
the population movements, food was often not provided and the conditions during and 
                                                 
20 ibid. 
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after the displacements were frequently inhumane (Kiernan, 2002).  Families were 
also often separated, with individuals sent to different areas and worksites. The forced 
population movements involved the loss of homes and property, the dispersal of 
families and communities, the loss of previous livelihoods and ultimately often led to 
malnutrition and starvation in the worksites to which individuals and families were 
relocated.21 While the forced population movements do not immediately appear to 
have gendered elements, the article highlights the interrelationship between social 
harms and gendered experiences and the ways in which structural inequalities fed into 
experiences of the harms. 
 
Exploring the social harms and gendered experiences of forced displacement  
 
Drawing on feminist theories of social harm (West, 1997; Conaghan, 2002; Ní 
Aoláin, 2009), this section opens up some of the social and gendered experiences of 
familial separation and starvation of family members both as a basis for exploring 
experiences of harm and, in the last past of the article, for interrogating the narrative 
produced by the Trial Chamber judgment. In order to understand experiences of the 
forced population movements in Cambodia, it is crucial to move beyond a focus on 
physical harm to a holistic understanding that foregrounds the social nature of harm 
and reflects human relationships and connectedness.   
 
Exploring feminist understandings of social harm in relation to Cambodia 
 
Feminist understandings of human interdependence have contested law’s focus on the 
                                                 
21 Harms related to the worksites will be dealt with in case 002/02. 
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individual and on physical integrity harms.  Feminist research has highlighted that 
harm is not simply experienced individually, as so often presented in law (West, 
1997; Conaghan, 2002).  Conaghan (2002, 322) has argued that, “although we tend to 
see harm as vested in the individual who sustains it, our concept of harm is 
thoroughly social”.  The social nature of harm is twofold; in terms of how social 
location impacts on who is affected by harm, as well as how experiences are mediated 
through social understandings of the harm involved (Conaghan, 2002, 322).  Rather 
than perceiving harm to focus predominantly on the individual, a social understanding 
of harm reflects the impact of harms on families, communities and social structures 
and how the social interrelates with and often shapes individual lived experiences (Ní 
Aoláin, 2009, 224; Sankey, 2015).   
 
 Understanding the relational nature of the self opens up the plurality and 
complexity of harm and the ways in which harm is understood and experienced 
through social meanings and relationships (Ní Aoláin, 2009, 236).  As Nedelsky 
(2011, 30) has argued, “what matters to individuals, and what matters about 
individuality, are best understood and fostered in relational terms”.  Relationships are 
central to the human experience, both in terms of intimate relationships with others 
and “social structural relationships, such as gender, economic relations, and forms of 
governmental power” (Nedelsky, 2011, 4).  Foregrounding the social nature of harm 
opens up the realities and contexts of lived experiences of violence, particularly of 
violence centred on the destruction of human relationships and on harms to loved 
ones, such as familial separation and starvation of family members.   
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 The harms of forced displacement go beyond the physical, involving the 
“ways in which the family, the home, and communities are fractured socially” (Baines 
& Gauvin, 2014). Indeed, forced displacement often involves a complex 
interrelationship between physical, psychological and social harms in terms of 
malnutrition, loss of health and well being as well as destitution, social dislocation 
and familial separation (Sankey, 2015).  Forced displacements not only remove the 
individual from a certain physical location, but also displace them from the home 
environment and often from communal and family structures and networks (Sankey, 
2015).   
 
 The forced population movements perpetrated in Cambodia were not simply 
experienced individually but were profoundly social. They involved not merely 
physical dislocation, but also social dislocation and often the separation of families.  
Indeed, social dislocation and familial separation were not only incidental features of 
the population movements, but often constituted part of a deliberate policy to rebuild 
Cambodia according to Khmer Rouge ideology (Mam, 2004). Phase one set the scene 
for the implementation of worksites across Cambodia, while phase two often 
consolidated this process and further removed individuals from social support and 
survival networks through movement to different worksites.  The harms therefore 
centred on disrupting or destroying human relationships and the social meanings 
underpinning such relationships.   
 
 The centrality of the family in pre-Khmer Rouge Cambodian society, and the 
prevalence of traditional gender roles determined social perceptions and meanings of 
the harm of familial separation.  As Mam’s research illustrates, “During the pre-KR 
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period the family and the economic, cultural and religious institutions that supported 
it, formed the very foundation of Cambodian society.  The KR attack on the family 
and its institutions thus threatened Cambodian society in a very fundamental way” 
(Mam, 2004). The loss of family and community frequently meant a loss of social 
support structures and survival networks (Ye, 2011).   “Basic social networks of 
kinship and community were shattered; all loyalty was to be redirected to the Angkar” 
(Ledgerwood, 2012, 68).  
 
The relationship between gendered experiences and social harm 
 
Social understandings of harm help to open up gendered experiences. Gender 
inequalities and social location impact on how harms of forced displacement are 
experienced and the social meanings underpinning the harms. In some situations 
women may be disproportionately affected by particular harms. In Cambodia, 
pregnant women and those who had recently given birth were particularly affected by 
the evacuation of Phnom Penh, due to the obvious difficulty and danger of the long 
journey and the inhumane conditions.  In addition, supporters of the previous Lon Nol 
regime, particularly soldiers and civil servants, were immediately targeted for direct 
killings, meaning that a higher proportion of women may have been left to suffer 
phase one and phase two of the population movements (Ledgerwood, 2012).   
 
 Experiences in Cambodia were also inevitably mediated through underlying 
gender inequalities and traditional roles within the family. “Even when women are 
suffering similar violations as men, they have a different impact on women, due to 
their pre-existing socio-economic and legal status, as well as the gender constructions 
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in patriarchal societies” (Lemaitre & Sandvik, 2014, 245). The forced displacements 
and subsequent separation of men, women and children into different work groups 
that occurred in many regions, prevented women from fulfilling traditional roles of 
looking after the home, caring for children and feeding their families (Mam, 2004).  
Similarly, the population movements stripped men of their homes and previous 
livelihoods and thus their traditional roles of providing for their families. While 
policies differed across Cambodia, family separation seemed to be prevalent in many 
areas (Mam, 2004).  
 
 This is not to argue that familial separation necessarily constitutes a more 
profound harm for women, as West (1997) has suggested, but rather that social 
contexts undoubtedly inform and shape lived experiences. In opening up such 
gendered experiences there is, however, the risk that perceptions of women 
predominantly as mothers and caregivers are reinforced and that traditional family 
structures are reified, rather than challenged (Ní Aoláin, 2000). A social 
understanding of harm may therefore raise tensions from a feminist perspective in 
terms the dangers of naturalisation of gendered roles and inequalities (Ní Aoláin, 
2000).  While these dangers should not be underestimated, ignoring or marginalising 
gendered experiences is equally problematic.  It is therefore important that in drawing 
out gendered experiences, the complexities of gender inequalities and roles are 
captured.  Although understandings of human connectedness and relational 
approaches have tended to come from feminist perspectives, this should not mean that 
they are predominantly conceptualised in relation to women (Nedelsky, 2011). 
Rather, drawing on an understanding of human connectedness opens up the 
complexities of human relationships and the ways in which underlying inequalities, 
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including gender, shape experiences.  
 
 The traditional social positioning of women as mothers and wives in 
Cambodian society and of men as patriarchal fathers and providers for their families 
was an important factor that influenced experiences of forced displacement and 
familial separation.  As Ní Aoláin (2000, 325) has highlighted in the context of the 
Holocaust in Europe, “Mothering is a gendered undertaking and is understood as such 
by those seeking to destroy the fabric of social life in a community … Both 
psychological studies and individual testimonies demonstrate that women experienced 
forced separation from their children in profoundly different ways than did men”.   
 
 While the context of Europe during the Holocaust is very different from that 
of Cambodia in the mid to late 1970s, similar gendered roles were evident (Natale, 
2011; Jacobsen, 2008).  Despite some movement towards gender equality in 
Cambodia in the early 1970s, particularly in urban areas, traditional gender roles were 
still very much embedded in society (Jacobsen, 2008).  As Mam (2004, 134) has 
highlighted, the separation of young children from mothers was particularly 
“awkward and unprecedented for the traditional Khmer family at that time … During 
the pre-KR period, although grandmothers sometimes helped to ease the burden, 
child-care remained a mother’s responsibility”.  The harm of separation from children 
therefore had particular social meanings in the Cambodian context, in terms of the 
negation of the social norms of childcare and traditional gender roles.   
 
 Indeed, the forced population movements instituted the Khmer Rouge’s 
attempts to completely uproot and recreate Cambodian society, to change the nature 
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of gender roles and to dismantle existing family structures (Jacobsen, 2008; Mam, 
2004).  The forced displacements were the first decisive step in forcing women and 
men from their homes and into an agrarian society.  The population movements were 
therefore part of a process of dismantling existing social norms and structures.  
Nevertheless, despite Khmer Rouge claims to gender-neutrality, their policies were 
often not gender-neutral, nor did they institute gender equality (Jacobsen, 2008). The 
regime may have outwardly endorsed a degree of gender equality, from which some 
female cadres may have benefited.  Nevertheless, possibilities for women to attain 
equal status and power remained strictly limited (Jacobsen, 2008, 218-19; 
Ledgerwood, 2008, 70-71).  It is therefore important to recognise the continuities in 
women’s experiences of discrimination and violence before and during the regime, 
particularly within the family, but also the ways in which the violence of the Khmer 
Rouge regime constituted different forms of harm. The regime engendered the loss of 
traditional spheres of influence for many women, but often gave them little in return 
(Ledgerwood, 2008, 69).  
 
 Harms of starvation of children and family members experienced during and 
in the aftermath of the forced population movements also had profound social 
meanings and implications.  Social dislocation and familial separation limits the 
availability of social survival networks that are often central to the ability of 
individuals to access basic resources (Sankey, 2015).  Familial separation also negates 
the social role of food in maintaining family and communal bonds. While again 
mindful of the obvious dangers of essentialising women’s experiences, it is important 
to note the very significant roles women traditionally play across many societies, 
including pre-Khmer Rouge Cambodia, in relation to food and feeding their families 
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(Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 2003, 7; Jacobsen, 2008; Van Esterik, 
1999).  The inability to feed family members, particularly children, therefore has 
particular gendered connotations.   
 
 The extent of the harms of the forced population movements, of familial 
separation and starvation of family members meant that Cambodian society as a 
whole was affected. Moreover, the psychological harms were inevitably infused with 
social meaning, as the violence centred on reconstituting society (Daryn and Aylward, 
2011, 24). Psychological harm therefore cannot be understood in this context without 
foregrounding the social harm involved and the extent of societal trauma.  Indeed, “if 
gendered experiences are to be recognized and addressed, more nuanced 
understandings of mental harm that better integrate social elements of harm may need 
to be explored” (Sankey, 2015).  Without an understanding of the social nature of 
harm and the centrality of family in pre-Khmer Rouge Cambodia, the experiences 
voiced in the oral testimony are liable to become lost or distorted. 
 
The Trial Chamber Judgment: reflecting social and gendered harms? 
 
Drawing on these insights, the last part of the article focuses on the Trial Chamber 
judgment.  The judgment is undoubtedly significant in providing legal recognition of 
the scale and gravity of the forced population movements perpetrated in Cambodia 
(Williams, 2014).  Nevertheless, a deeper exploration, in conjunction with a reading 
of the civil party oral testimony, reveals its limitations.  While familial separation and 
inhumane conditions experienced by family members were recognised in the 
judgment as grave crimes under international law, they were ultimately 
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decontextualised, thus obscuring the centrality of the social harm and nuances in 
gendered experiences.  Indeed, the limited gender awareness of the Court played out 
in the judgment in producing a predominantly gender-neutral account of the forced 
population movements.  
 
The Findings of the Trial Chamber and the limitations of the judgment  
 
The Trial Chamber found Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan guilty of the crimes against 
humanity of murder, extermination, other inhumane acts (forcible transfer and attacks 
on human dignity) and persecution in relation to phase one and two of the forced 
population movements.22  The judgment confirmed that the crime of extermination 
can be perpetrated through “conditions of life aimed at destroying part of a 
population, such as withholding food or medicine” and that dolis eventualis 
constitutes sufficient mens rea (para. 416-417).  This enabled the Trial Chamber to 
find that the inhumane conditions in which people had been moved during both 
population movements, which Khmer Rouge cadres knew would likely cause death of 
large numbers of persons, constituted extermination as a crime against humanity (para 
562, 646-8). The Trial Chamber also found that the conditions imposed during both 
population movements constituted “serious attacks against human dignity and caused 
the victims serious bodily and mental harm” amounting to other inhumane acts of 
attacks against human dignity (para. 565; para. 644).  The recognition that the forced 
population movements and the inhumane conditions suffered constituted crimes 
against humanity, and thus particularly grave harms, is undoubtedly important both 
for survivors and Cambodian society.  As such, the significance of the judgment 
                                                 
22  Co-Prosecutors v Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan n. 4 above. 
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should not be underestimated.   
 
 Nevertheless, the narrative of the judgment suffers from the severance of case 
002. While international criminal law necessarily fragments understandings of harm 
through dividing violence into the framework of the various international crimes, the 
severance of case 002 further fragmented understandings of the violence in 
Cambodia. The judgment was prevented from reflecting the ways in which the forced 
population movements related to other harms and thus from reflecting the long-term 
impacts of the forced displacements. Case 002/01 will need to be read in conjunction 
with the forthcoming judgment in case 002/02 and it would be a mistake to judge it 
too harshly at present, particularly as it is currently at the appeal stage and therefore 
not yet final. 
 
 However, the limitations of the judgment also stem from the failure of the 
Court to contextualise the violence in relation to Cambodia society, which may 
potentially be perpetuated in case 002/02.  It is notable that despite being an 
internationalised tribunal, based in Cambodia, the Court failed to place the crimes 
within the context of Cambodian society at the time.  Although the judgment gave 
considerable space to setting out the facts underlying the two phases of the population 
movements, it did not explore the context of Cambodian society in which these harms 
were perpetrated.  While the Cambodian audience may be able to read this context 
into the judgment to some degree, it must be remembered that as a hybrid tribunal, the 
narrative of the judgment has wider significance for international law and for 
international understandings of the violence perpetrated in Cambodia.  Moreover, as a 
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tribunal addressing historical crimes, contextualisation of Cambodian society at the 
time of the atrocities is all the more important.   
 
 Due to this lack of contextualisation, social harms and gendered experiences 
were frequently marginalised within the judgment.  Significantly, the Court did 
recognise the particular difficulties and harms experienced by women in relation to 
pregnancy and childbirth during the forced population movements, under the crime 
against humanity of ‘other inhumane acts’ in terms of ‘attacks against human dignity’ 
(para 564). Indeed, in analysing the requisite elements of ‘other inhumane acts’ the 
Chamber cited the suffering of “the sick, the injured, the elderly, the pregnant and the 
young” (para 565).  As such, the experiences of vulnerable members of society were 
recognised.  However, aside from these highly visible gendered experiences, the 
judgment largely produces a narrative of the gender-neutrality of the forced 
population movements.  
 
 The argument of the article is not that the Court ignored familial separation, 
but that the meanings of the harms involved were not explored or fully recognised.  
The judgment did recognise that families were separated during the forced population 
movements.  Indeed, evidence that evacuees were “made to evacuate without all of 
their family members, were made to abandon weak family members along the way, or 
were separated from family members at checkpoints during the journey”, was 
recognised under the crime against humanity of ‘other inhumane acts’ as ‘forcible 
transfer’ (para. 550). However, the impact of familial separation in a society where 
family structures had previously been paramount and where gender roles and 
inequalities remained embedded was not explicitly acknowledged.  
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 While recognising that the elderly had to be abandoned by family members 
(para. 550), the harm was not contextualised in relation to Cambodian society, where 
elderly relatives were traditionally revered and taken care of by younger family 
members. Moreover, the gendered aspects of childcare and caring for elderly relatives 
were not recognised, meaning that the ways in which pre-existing gender roles 
impacted on experiences of familial separation and the social meanings of the harms 
involved was silenced.   
 
 The judgment also recognised that “Victims who were transferred, lost their 
homes, lost contact with family members, their surroundings, and their places of 
worship experienced a diminished sense of ‘physical and spiritual security’.  In 
particular, children who were displaced and thus taken away from their familiar 
surroundings lost the opportunity to interact with others, as well as the ability to plan 
for the  future; they also faced difficulties settling into new and hostile surroundings” 
(para 523; see also para 582).  It is significant that social dislocation is raised in the 
judgment in terms of people being forced to “re-socialise” following phase two of the 
population movements, thus illustrating that the Court had the potential to recognise 
these types of harms.  However, the experience of social dislocation was not further 
explored or contextualised (para 582).  In particular, the loss of community and social 
support networks on adults and the possible gendered nature of these experiences 
were not acknowledged.  
 
 Similarly, while the judgment recognised psychological harm to some degree, 
thus illustrating the Trial Chamber’s awareness of harms other than physical violence, 
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its approach remained limited.  Significantly, it did acknowledge that “[i]n addition to 
physical trauma endured during their exodus, many Cambodians continue to suffer 
from anxiety as a result of having experienced great loss” (para. 522).  Moreover, the 
Trial Chamber drew on the testimony of Dr Chhim Sotheara from the Cambodian 
Transcultural Psychosocial Organization, whose research has been focused on 
developing an understanding of trauma appropriate to the Cambodia context (Chhim, 
2012).  Such evidence could have enabled the Court to reflect more fully on the 
relationships between social and psychological harm.  Nevertheless, the space given 
in the judgment to the recognition of psychological harm was minimal and again, the 
harms were not contextualised in relation to Cambodian society (paras 522-24). The 
section on reparations allowed some further space for the acknowledgement of 
psychological harms.  However, this part of the judgment largely repeated evidence it 
had previously cited, without further contextualising the harms involved (paras 1141-
1150).   
 
Social Dislocation, Familial Separation and Harms of Starvation: Exploring the Civil 
Party Testimony 
 
In contrast, a reading of the civil party oral testimony reveals the centrality of social 
dislocation, familial separation and the harms of starvation of family members to 
many of these civil parties’ experiences. It reveals how social meanings and gender 
norms infused experiences of the harms.  While both male and female civil parties 
voiced the harm of familial separation and starvation of family members, it is possible 
to note differences in experiences in the oral testimony.  In particular, the ages of the 
civil parties differed, such there were a larger number of female civil parties who 
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experienced the Khmer Rouge regime at a time when they were already parents and 
spoke of their experiences of separation from and deaths of their children.  Due both 
to these dynamics and the higher number of female civil parties who gave oral 
testimony on the population movements there are inevitably questions over the 
representative nature of the testimony.  However, the aim is not to map out the harms 
of the forced population movements, but rather to explore such lived experiences in 
order to scrutinise the narrative produced by the Trial Chamber judgment and how the 
court drew on this evidence.  Reading the judgment in conjunction with the civil party 
testimony thus highlights some of its limitations and the lost opportunities for 
contextualisation of the harms experienced.   
 
 Notably, the judgment drew extensively, both in the text and in the footnotes, 
on the civil party testimony in its examination of the offences perpetrated, meaning 
that the voices of the civil parties are evident. However, the ways in which the 
judgment drew on this testimony and the kinds of experiences it marginalised 
illustrate the limitations of its approach.  Despite the number of female civil parties in 
the case, women’s particular experiences were not explicitly reflected beyond the 
reproductive roles of pregnancy and giving birth and hence a focus on female 
vulnerability and biological difference.  While female civil parties’ testimony was 
documented and widely drawn on, it was integrated into the judgment in a way that 
largely elided how social structures and gender inequalities shaped lived experiences.   
 
 As such, the judgment did not open up how gender intersected with other 
identities in shaping experiences, other than a broad recognition of the demarcation 
enforced by the Khmer Rouge between the ‘base’ and the ‘new’ people (para. 656).  
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Indeed, it is notable that while the judgment drew quite extensively on Ms Sou 
Sotheavy’s testimony (27 May 2013), it silenced her transgender identity and ignored 
the particular harms she voiced as a transgender woman.  Although Ms Sou Sotheavy 
(p. 11 and 18) spoke explicitly of her experience of being displaced alongside other 
transgender people and of the discrimination she faced following the forced 
population movements due to her gender identity, these elements of her testimony 
were ignored.   
 
 Familial separation constitutes a recurrent harm voiced through much of the 
civil party oral testimony. Fourteen of the civil parties who gave oral testimony spoke 
directly of their own experiences of familial separation either during or in the 
aftermath of the forced population movements. In addition, some of the civil party 
oral testimony referred to the horror of the evacuation and how they witnessed other 
families, particularly children, lost and separated in the confusion (see, for example, 
Ms Po Dina, 30 May 2013, 100).  The testimony provides insights into the devastating 
experiences and the social and cultural meanings of familial separation, and provides 
the contextualisation of the violence that the judgment often lacks.  
  
 The centrality of familial separation and social dislocation to the harms of the 
forced population movements is evident in the testimony:  
 
“During the evacuation from Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975, it could be compared to 
a bomb was exploded to shatter all the families in Phnom Penh. We separated from 
one another in a sudden movement. We separated from family members, from friends, 
and we suddenly lost all what we earned and all the properties we lost. We did not get 
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news from them; some of them even until today and in around September 1975, I was 
by myself far away from my native village, from my family members and from my 
close friends” (Ms Toeng Sokha, 4 December 2012, 98). 
 
 Much of the testimony that voices familial separation dwells on the loss of 
community structures and relationships, and on their profound social and 
psychological impacts (see, for example, Ms Sang Rath, 27 May 2013, 60 and Ms 
Chan Socheat, 29 May 2013).  As Ms Sophan Sovanny (30 May 2013, 54) related, 
“we had to separate from one another in the family and this separation was suffering. 
We did not have any food to eat and we had to leave, stay away from our parents and 
our beloved brothers and sisters. This was the tragedy in our life”.  
 
 Ms Mom Sam Oeum (6 November 2012, 20) related the shattering of her 
family structure during her testimony: “they separated my kids from me; all of my 
kids were separated”. The testimony also provides insights into the social meanings 
underlying these harms and the ways in which separation broke social norms.  As one 
civil party explained, “children were forced to leave their parents behind and you 
know that we worship our parents. Parents are very sacred to us and when we saw 
parents separate from their children, it was something that was extremely, extremely 
hard for Cambodian children” (Ms. Thouch Phandarasar, 29 May 2013, 9).  
 
 While some familial separation occurred as a result of or immediately after 
phase one and two of the population movements and thus came within the scope of 
the case, some of the separations occurred later and thus fall more clearly within the 
scope of case 002/02.  As such the severance of the case prevented some of the 
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testimony from being reflected in the judgment.  The severance therefore presents an 
artificial division between immediate and subsequent familial separation, which fails 
to reflect the ways in which the forced population movements fed directly into 
experiences of separation by laying the foundations for separation on the worksites.  
However, even where such testimony clearly relates to separation during and 
immediately after the forced population movements, the judgement does not reflect 
the social context surrounding these harms and their meanings, as expressed by the 
civil parties.   
 
 The testimony also strongly reflects the harm and trauma of deaths stemming 
from the harsh conditions of the forced population movements. However, while the 
judgment recognises the harsh conditions and the deaths, it fails to fully capture 
experiences of the harms themselves and in particular the social nature of the harm.  
Again, while the severance of the case prevented the judgment from integrating 
testimony relating to later starvation in the worksites, the judgment also suffers from 
the de-contextualisation of the harms when outlining deaths immediately following 
the population movements.  Moreover, much of the testimony highlights how 
isolation and separation violated the social norms of Cambodian society, evidence 
that the Court could have reflected on when outlining the harm of familial separation 
and loss of loved ones directly stemming from the forced population movements. 
 
 The inability to provide food for family members during and after the forced 
population movements, and thus fulfil family responsibilities and gender roles, 
resonates throughout much of the oral party testimony as a particularly traumatic 
harm, illustrating the sense of the relational self. While the loss of children through 
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any means is profoundly traumatic, such testimony illustrates the particular harm of 
witnessing your children dying of starvation or inhumane conditions and being unable 
to prevent it.  For example, Mrs Denise Affonço (13 December 2012, 104-5) related 
that, “When you see your daughter dying of hunger, and she says, “Mommy, can I 
have a bowl of rice?”, and I was never able to give her that bowl of rice before she 
died, then I can tell you I have undergone harm” (italics added). In addition, Ms. 
Thouch Phandarasar’s testimony reflects profound feelings of guilt regarding the 
inability to care for elderly parents, as required by Cambodian society.  “I retain a 
terrible feeling of guilt about this; not having been able to save my parents …  You 
never erase memories like that and that's why I'm here to ask this Court for justice” 
(Ms. Thouch Phandarasar, 29 May 2013, 13).   While such testimony reflects personal 
feelings of guilt it also reflects gendered dimensions of caring in Cambodian society, 
a context that the judgment does not acknowledge.    
 
 Some of the testimony also expresses deep feelings of loss and social 
dislocation following the death of loved ones, providing important insights into the 
complex social and psychological harms experienced, on which the judgment could 
have drawn.  Ms Po Dina (30 June 2013, 105) related that “[m]y life is like a woman 
in the Cambodian folk tale that I lost everyone; my husband, my mother and my son.  
I no longer had any hope with me.  My life would become meaningless as all the 
valuables to my life – that is, my beloved ones, all left”.  Relating the trauma to this 
Cambodian folktale reveals the social meanings infused in these experiences and 
illustrates the centrality of family and community to Cambodian society and the 
particular (gendered) harm of being left by oneself. Ms Sang Rath (27 May 2013, 60) 
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similarly related that “I was like an old woman in a Khmer folktale, Badacha; it 
means I’m by myself”.   
 
 The social meanings underlying the harm of isolation of children are also 
evident in some of the testimony.  As Mr Aun Phally (27 May, 2013, 36), who was a 
child at the time of the regime, related, “I considered myself a strange person that I 
lived by myself with no relatives”.  While this testimony goes beyond the scope of the 
forced population movements it could have been drawn on to explore how feelings of 
social dislocation were entwined with psychological despair and emotional emptiness 
and how destruction of relationships can collapse an individual’s sense of meaning 
and purpose.  As Ms Huo Chantha (29 May 2013, 81) expressed, “I was despaired.  I 
find that I was useless; I had no family members; my parents were all gone.  I look at 
everything around me, everything was meaningless for me; my life is completely 
meaningless”.  It is therefore hoped that such testimony is reflected on and explored 
in the remaining parts of case 002. 
 
Addressing Gendered Harms at the ECCC: Questions of Feminist Strategy 
 
Thus, although the Trial Chamber’s recognition that the forced population movements 
involved separation of families is of itself significant, the judgment represents a lost 
opportunity to surface the social and gendered nature of the harms. It highlights that 
even when women are able to participate as civil parties and to voice their 
experiences in criminal justice processes, these experiences may not be fully heard by 
the Court (SáCouto, 2011).  International(ised) criminal tribunals constitute imperfect 
tools for the narration and recognition of harm, and particularly of gendered 
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experiences (Buss, 2013; O’Rourke, 2013).  Legal responses to harm inevitably bring 
certain meanings and practices to bear that may render harm both visible and invisible 
(Buss, 2009).   
 
 International(ised) criminal tribunals therefore obscure many of the contexts 
and wider experiences of harms that may enable an understanding of social harms. In 
particular, the relationship between structural inequalities and experiences of mass 
violence may be silenced by the focus on extraordinary instances of political violence.  
Indeed, international criminal law has tended to focus on bodily violence to the 
exclusion of other forms of harm, including social harm (Nagy, 2008). While 
international criminal law recognises group harm, most obviously under genocide and 
crimes against humanity, the law largely fails to reflect and incorporate an 
understanding of relationships and human connectedness (Ní Aoláin, 2009). 
 
 The tension, highlighted earlier, between the recognition of the impact of 
gender inequalities and the dangers of essentialism therefore raises particular 
challenges for legal recognition of harms and experiences.  Ní Aoláin (2000, 325) has 
thus questioned “whether legal sanction should reflect the reality of the actual 
practices, even though identifying them as harms may bolster their embeddedness as 
social norms.  Or should the legal sanction conform to the ideal type of self, 
unencumbered by social context?”  The danger of the latter approach is that legal 
processes produce a narrative of the gender-neutrality of violence, which fails to 
reflect and contest structural inequalities in the particular society. In arguing for 
greater recognition of social harms there is therefore a need to be alert to the potential 
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of legal processes to essentialise gendered harms and silence the plurality of 
experiences, and to contest such representations.   
 
 Although it is impossible for any judgment to condense and reflect the 
complexity of victim and witness testimony, the ECCC could have attempted to set 
out the context of pre-Khmer Rouge society in discussing the nature of the violence.  
Doing so would have resulted in a judgment that more fully captured and reflected 
evidence of victims’ experiences, without impacting on the rights of the accused.  
Such contextualisation would not have made a difference to the verdict, but it would 
have provided a fuller account of the violence of the forced population movements 
and the nature of the harms involved.  As Ní Aoláin (2000) has argued more 
generally, ‘unless international legal prohibitions can address the totality of harm 
experienced by the victim, prohibitions will fail to produce any meaningful form of 
accountability’.  While such complexity is obviously difficult for any tribunal to fully 
grapple with and reflect, international crimes of whatever type are inevitably 
complex.  International tribunals are perpetually presented with social, political and 
cultural complexity, such that greater recognition of the complex social harms should 
not be deemed to be particularly unrealistic.   
 
 International and hybrid criminal tribunals play an important expressive and 
performative role in narrating and recording past violence, judging harms as well as 
providing an agenda for “transition” in the society concerned (Buss, 2011).  The types 
of harms named and recognised within these tribunals feed into and inform the nature 
and terms of the transition.  Recognition of the social complexity of harm is thus 
important both in reflecting lived experiences and in promoting attention to social and 
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gendered inequalities in the transitional society. While this role is perhaps less 
apparent in the Cambodian context, as a situation of historical political repression, the 
ECCC will necessarily play a part in producing a narrative of the Khmer Rouge 
regime, shaping understandings both in Cambodia and internationally, and promoting 
certain responses to the on-going experiences of survivors.    
 Indeed, the historic nature of the crimes addressed by the Court mean that it is 
all too easy for the work of the ECCC to be distanced from contemporary experiences 
of harm and inequality.  The terms of transition are focused narrowly on 
accountability for Khmer Rouge atrocities, rather than incorporating a broader agenda 
of societal change and transformation.  Adopting a more contextual approach to the 
harms perpetrated and reflecting the social complexity of harm would be an important 
way for the Court to open up a contemporary discourse in Cambodia around the 
nature of harm and inequality, while remaining within the confines of its statute.  As a 
hybrid tribunal, the Court’s judgment may also influence wider understandings of the 
harms of forced displacement and starvation in international criminal law, meaning 
that the marginalisation of social harms and gendered experiences may be perpetuated 
in other tribunals.  
 
 The largely gender-neutral approach of the Trial Chamber judgment in case 
002/01 served to marginalise the particular experiences of women and closed down a 
space for broader societal discourse on issues of gender equality.  Indeed, given 
Khmer Rouge claims regarding the equal treatment of men and women, the dangers 
of producing a narrative of gender-neutrality are all the more significant in the 
Cambodian context.  It is particularly important that in case 002/02 the Court does not 
accept Khmer Rouge claims regarding gender equality, but interrogates and opens up 
 34 
the gendered nature of the violence perpetrated and the ways in which shifts in gender 






The article has argued for the importance of a social understanding of harm in order to 
reflect gendered experiences in Cambodia. However, it has also highlighted the ways 
in which social harms and gendered experiences may be elided by international(ised) 
criminal tribunals.  Even when survivors are permitted to testify as civil parties and 
where women constitute the majority of these civil parties, courts may still not fully 
hear and reflect the complexities of harms.  Case 002/02 provides the ECCC with 
further opportunities to develop a more contextual approach that encompasses the 
social elements of harms of the Khmer Rouge regime, which it is hoped the Court will 
adopt.  As such there is a need for further feminist scrutiny of the Court and research 
into the social nature of harms experienced in Cambodia. Providing “justice” means 
rendering visible the impact of underlying inequalities and social contexts on the 
harms of the Khmer Rouge regime, in order to both reflect lived experiences and 
challenge on-going violence and inequality.  In decontextualising the harms and often 
eliding the social and gendered elements, the Court closes down opportunities to 
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